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/  tr/<. 
e ~~ -rom 3-~ Dt ~-( ,/.-o'-"--hio) 5~ /-€) 
(Peck, C.J.: Kinneary & Duncan, 
DJ Is) ~-,t ,z,..,~  , 
J\/ v. 
Federal/Civil Timely Qo}Y~ESSEX, Superintendent of W · Public Instruction 
~ 1. Summary: This E lishmen~ <nvolves an 
~• \) Ohio aid-to-private-education statute which was obviously tailored 
• 
to meet the criteria of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
2. FACTS & HOLDING BELOW: On July 1, 1975, the 3-J DC upheld 
the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code§ 3317.062 which provided for 
state aid to private schools in the state. This Court subsequently 
decided Meek v. Pittenaer, supra striking down the greatest portion 
of a Pennsylvania statute simila r to the Ohio statute. The Court th e n 
vacated and remanded this case in light of Meek. Wollma n¼ Essex , 
.1?1 Tl C:: . QR? (1q75). 
.. e 
- -2- -The Ohio General Assembly then enacted the current statute. Ohio 
Rev. Code 3317.06. It provides five separate types of aid to private 
school pupils. Appellants challenge each of these in whole or in part 
1/ 
as violating the Establishment of Religion clause of the Constitution.-
The statute provides (1) Loans of textbooks, instructional materials 
2/ 
and instructional equipment to private school pupils or their parents;-
on-campus 
(2)/physician, nursing, and optometric care, as well as speech, 
hearing and psychological diagnostic services; (3) off-campus 
therapeutic psychological speech and hearing services, as well as 
remedial programs for deaf, blind, crippled, and emotionally disturbed 
3/ 
pupils;-(4) standardized testing; and (5) transportation for field 
trips. This aid is to be implemented by each school district in Ohio, 
and is to be provided only to private schools which do not discriminate 
on the basis of race, religion or national origin in their hiring and 
• admission policies. The 3-Judge DC unanimously upheld the constitution-
ality of the statute. 
-
3. CONTENTIONS & DISCUSSION: Appellants raise somewhat different 
objections with respect to each of the programs outlined above, so I 
will discuss them separately. 
(1) Loans of textbooks, materials and equipment: Appellants 
concede the constitutionality of the loans of textbooks to pupils and 
1/ It is stipulated that 86 percent of Ohio's private schools are 
operated by the Catholic church, and an additional ten percent are 
operated by other religious denominations. 
2/ The statute limits distribution of such materials and equipment 
as not capable of diversion to religious use. 
3/ Therapeutic and remedial serie s are to be prov i ded in pub l ic 
schools, public cente rs (e.g. fire houses) or in mobile units p a rked 
off the private school premise s. 
- -3- -their parents under the authority of Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 421 U.S. 
at 359 and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). However, 
they ch~ n~ quipment and materials. They argue that 
materials and equipment, unlike textbooks, cannot meaningfully be used 
by individual pupils, but must be lent to the group as whole. They 
suggest that any purported loans of e.g. laboratories, gymnastic 
equipment and sewing machines to pupils must be a subterfuge, especially 
in light of the fact that such materials may be stored on the premises 
of the private school. 
Although, the line between a loan to the pupils and a loan to the 
p~ivate school is admittedly thin, this Court's decisions in Meek and 
Allen seem to indicate that such line should nonetheless not be 
ignored. Textbooks, as well as materials and equipment, are used during 
group school activities, and must be ordered for the group as a whole 
4t to be useful. The Court in Meek and Allen sanctioned procedures whereby 
student requests for the books were filed initially with the private 
school, which then, in turn,submitted summaries for these requests 
-
with public officials. 421 U.S. at 361. While, no doubt, here also, 
the school will be involved in directing and coordinating the requests 
of students, the equipment will be under the supervision of state 
employees, and pupils and their parents will deal directly with them 
in obta'ning use of the materials and equipment. 
There does not appear !;S) be such an essential difference between 
- ---- ~--- --- =-- ~ ~ 
textbooks and equipment that one is compelled to accept appellants' 
argument that a loan of the latter to the pupils must be deemed a sham -per se. The Court in Meek certainly did not intimate such a distinc-
tion. While the Court struck down the Penn. program providing loans of 
materials and equipment, it did so, apparently, wholly on the basis 
that the loans were made directly to the sectarian schools. The Court's .,,,. -- -concern appeared to be that by lending these materials dire ctly to the 
(9 
i 
- -4- -school, the school's sectarian religious purposes would be furthered: 
Even though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when it 
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive 
that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed 
in the religious mission,' state aid has the impermissible 
primary effect of advancing religion. 
421 U.S. at 365-66 (citation omitted). While lending materials to the 
pupils of these schools also provides some advantage to the school, such 
collateral benefit is also derived if the state loans textbooks to the 
pupils. However, the Court upheld the textbook lending scheme, id. at 
362-65. It therefore appears that the Court considered loans made 
directly to the school by the state to stand on substantially different 
footing from loans made to the pupils, but from which the school also 
derives a benefit. 
(2) Diagnostic Services: Appellants concede that provision of on-
/
campus. . d . . . physician, optometric an nurs1.ng services by the state does not violate 
- the Establishment Clause. They do argue however that the provision of 
similar services for disabilities relating to speech, hearing and 
psychological disorders does constitute such a violation. Appellants 
differentiate the latter types of services from the former on the basis 
that speech, hearing and psychological diagnoses require substanti ally 
more communication between the professional and the pupil than do diag-
noses for other types of disorders. They suggest that this added 
communication would constitu t e an opportunity for the sta : e-employed 
diagnostician to inculcate religious values. With respect to psychologica J 
services in particular, appellants make the somewhat incredible claim that 
-
~ 
, students might be diagnosed as psychologically disturbed if they show 
signs of religious heresy. 
I am at a loss to understand how state-employed professionals are 
likely to par ticipate in the dissemination of religous education wh i le 
47 The fact that the ma t e ria ls may be store d at the private school 
\
1poes not seem to have substa nti a l bearing . The scheme s upheld in Mee k 
b nd All e n involved stor a ge o f t h e t ext b ooks l e nt to the pupils o n the 





they test pupils f! reading, hearing and psychological disabilities. 
While, indeed, these types of diagnoses may involve more communication 
between diagnostician and pupil than diagnosis of other disturbances or 
defects, it appears to me that in the relatively short time which the 
pupil spends with the professional, the chance of religious indoctrination 
5/ 
is miniscule.- In any case, appellants' argument, at least with respect 
to reading and hearing diagnostic services seems to be foreclosed by 
this Court's statement in Meek to the effect that "'speech and hearing 
services,' at least to the extent such services are diagnostic, seems 
to fall within that class of general welfare services for children that 
may be provided by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that 
accrues to church-related schools." 421 U.S. at 371, n.21. While the 
footnote goes on to strike down that portion of the statue which provided 
for such services, this was done on the basis that the provision could 
not be deemed severable from other portions of the statue which had 
been struck down by the Court. 
(3) Therapeutic Services: Appellants do not challenge the con-
stitutionality of this range of services insofar as they are provided 
in public schools, as part of the public schools' general programs. ---------What they do contend is that the setting up of therapeutic centers on 
public non-school premises or in curb-side mobile units, for the exclu-
sive benefit of private school st -1dents constitutes unconstitutional 
aid to religion. While they concede that the State has an important 
interest in providing children who have speech or hearing deficiencies, 
or who are crippled, handicapped or emotionally disturbed, the types 
of therapeutic services which will enable them to participate in educationa 
programs, they argue that centers designed to serve only private schools 
~/ Diagnosis only is performed on school premises. Therapeutic 
programs take place outside the school, in public centers. See dis-





constitute a direct aid to religion and that these centers will even-
tually become involved in fostering religious values. 
I again fail to appreciate appellants' argument. If the State 
has an important interest in providing therapeutic services to pupils 
to alleviate educational handicaps, there does not appear to be any pro-
blem with providing centers, on public school premises, designed to 
service private schools. Such services are already being provided to 
public school students on public school premises, so public school 
--o;'-
pupils are not being deprived of an equivalent opportunity.- For 
efficiency of administration, the State is simply allocating use of the 
new centers to pupils attending specific private schools. Nor do I see - - -
any problem with the positioning of mobile therapeutic units outside the 
gates of private schools. Such centers would be conveniently close so 
that private school pupils need to be exposed to danger and loss of 
time, yet the administration and operation of the centers would be kept -----------
separate from the administration and operation of the private schools. M 
This seems consistent with the analysis in Meek where the Court 
struck down Pennsylvania's remedial services program, which was provided 
within the private schools, stating the following: 
To be sure, auxiliary services personnel, because not 
employed by the non-public schools, are not directly 
subject to the discipline of a religious authority. · 
[Citation] But they are p e rforming important educationa l 
services in school s in wh i c h e duca tion is an integral 
part of the domina nt sectar i a n mission and in which an 
atmosphe re de dicated t o the a dva ncement of r elig ious b e lie f 
is constantly mainta ined. [Citation.] The potential 
for impermissible f ostering of r e lig ion under these circum-
stances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless pre s ent. 
To be certain that aux iliary t e achers remain religiously 
neutral, as the Constitution demands, the State would 
have to impose limitations on the activities of auxiliary 
personnel and then engage in some form of continuing 
surveilla nce to ensure that these restrictions were being 
followed. '!:J:_/ 
22/ The prese nce o f a ux ilia ry teachers in church related 
schools, more over , has t he pote ntial for provo k ing con-
trove rsy b e tween the Commo nwealth a nd religiou s a uthori t i e s 
6/ In fact, the st~t ut~ limits .all ~id. ~o pr i v ~te school pupil s 
t n t he-tvne th e school di s tr i ct p r ovides i n i c s publi c school s . 
-
- -7- -over the extent of the teachers' responsibilities and the 
meaning of the legislative restrictions on the content of 
their instruction. [Citation]. 
421 U.S. at 317-72 (emphasis added). The problems enumerated in this 
passage seem to be avoided where the remedial services are provided 
off the private school premises. 
There does remain the problem, mentioned by the Court in Meek, 
that provision of such services, where funding is appropriate on a 
periodic basis, will provide "successive opportunities for political 
fragmentation and division along religious lines, one of the principal 
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect." 
Id. at 372. It is unclear, however, whether the Court viewed this as 
an independent basis for striking down the auxiliary services provision 
in Meek, or whether it merely considered this as one element in showing 
an Establishment Clause violation. The following passage seems to 
indicate that the latter analysis is the correct one: 
This potential for political entanglement, together 
with the administrative entan':)·lement which would be necessary 
to ensure that auxiliary-services personnel remain strictly 
neutral and nonideological when functioning in church-
related schools, compels the conclusion that [the statute] 
violated the constitutional prohibition against laws 
"respecting an establishment of religion." 
Id. (emphasis added). Here, while there does appear to exist some 
danger of political controversies, it seems to be far less than that 
in Meek where the auxiliary services were provided directl~· to the paro-
chial schools. As discussed above, moreover, administrative entangle-
ment is eliminated by the Ohio scheme. Under the circumstances, I think 
the DC correctly held these programs unobjectionable. 
(4) Standardized Testing. Appellant's argument that the adrninistra-
tion of standardized tests to pupils of private schools constitutes an 
- Establishment Clause violation is based on Levitt v. Committee f or Public 
Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) where the Court invalidated a New York 
statutory scheme for reimburs ement of church- sponsored schools for 
,.·-
-
f .e . d expenses o examination an -testing of pupils. -8- The tes1S in Levitt, 
however, were prepared and graded by the personnel of the private school, 
and in that context were held, by the Court, to be an "integral part of 
the teaching process." Id. at 481. The tests in this case, by contrast, 
are prepared and graded by the State. They are administered to 
------------
pupils in both private and public schools, to determine whether the 
schools are providing an adequate level of education to the pupils. 
Since the State accredits private schools, it certainly has an interest 
in ascertaining whether the education they provide is on a par with 
that provided in public schools. These State-wide tests can thus hardly 
be claimed to inculcate religious values (as might test which are pre-
pared by parochial school teachers), nor can they be said to be for 
~ 
the benefit of the private schools. Quite the contrary, they are a check 
upon the private schools, to assure that they comply with State stan-
<lards. ( 
(5) Field ~rip ~using. Appellants trans-
portation for field trips constitutes an imperishableA nhancement of 
the educational progrums of religious schools. While under the Court's 
other cases this argument might be persuasive, busing seems to have 
been placed in a category sui generis by Everson v. Board of Education, 
·330 U.S. 1 (1947). In that case the Court held that bus transportation 
of children to and from p r ivate r-~hools wa s not unconstitut ional, e ven 
though an incidental benefit was provided to private religious schools. 
The 3-Judge DC concluded that it could not "distinguish in a significant 
manner the constitutional provision to nonpublic school childre n of bus 
transportation on a daily basis [in Everson] from the provision of 
transportation on an occasional basis." Juris Statement at A 31. 
Everson aside, it would appear to me that transportation o f 
large numbers of children involve s such fund amental safe ty cons i dera tion s 
tha t the State may we ll have an imp o r t a nt inte r es t in providing b using 
- -9- -to all school children through state operated facilities, rather than 
permitting individual schools to provide their own transportation 
~ facilities. Moreover, busing is not the type of service which is 
likely to be diverted to a religious use. 
·-
-
CONCLUSION: The State of Ohio appears to have made a bona fide, 
conscientious effort to tailor its aid to private education to comply 
with this Court's opinions, particularly Meek v. Pittenger. Appellants' 
broadside attack on virtually every aspect of the statute appears to 
be based less upon a reasoned concern with a possible violation of the 
Establishment Clause, than on an unspoken hostility to private schools 
in general and parochial schools in particular. If appellants' arguments 
are upheld, this would make it virtually impossible for the State to 
provide any auxiliary assistance to private school pupils. I do not 
think that this is required by the Constitution or this Court's decisions. 
The judgment below should be summarily affirmed. 
There are motions to affirm or dismiss. 
12/13/76 
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.. LFP/lab 4/25i i 
No. 76-496 Wolman v. Essex 
This is another "establishment-of-religion" case, 
in which Ohio tailored it aid to private schools to meet 
the criteria of!:!!!,! v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349. The three-
judge court sustained the validity of the Ohio statute. 
The following categories of aid are involved: 
1. Loans of textbooks. Appellants conceded 
validity on the basis of~ and Allen. 
2. Loans to pupils of materials and equipment. 
Equipment such as that used in laboratories, gym equipment, 
sewing machines, etc., are to be lent to pupils rather than 
directly to the schools, although the equipment will be stored 
on premises. In Meek, we invalidated loans of equipment -
directly to the schools. We may have been drawing lines 
that are too fine, and making unprincipled distinctions. 
Lending equipment - conceded to be nonsectarian - does aid 
private schools, whether the loans are to bae pupils or to 
the schools. But on the authority of Allen, if equipment 
is made available to all students in the state on the same 
terms I see no principled distinction. 
3. Diagnostic services. Apparently appellants 
concede that provision of physician, optometric and nursing 
services by the state is valid, even .though the professionals 
- -
rendering this service come to the schools. 
But appellants try to draw a distinction with 
respect to speech, hearing and psychological diagnosis. I 
see no basis for a distinction. 
4. Therapeutic services. These are services to 
be rendered children with speech or hearing deficiencies, 
or who are crippled or emotionally disturbed. This State 
proposes to establish therapeutic centers in curbside mobile 
units or on nonschool premises. I see no problem. The 
services are provided all public and private school students 
in the State. 
6. Standardized testing. Standardized tests are 
given to all school pupils for purposes of accreditation. 
They have nothing to do with religion. 
6. Field trip busing. In Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, the Court held that bus transportation 
of all children - to public and private schools - was valid. 
Here, transportation is to be provided for special educational 
purposes exclusive of religious education. 
CODBI1ent: 
Although the State aid provided by Ohio to private 
schools is quite extensive, and certainly will contribute to 
the viability of such schools, as long as Allen, Everson and 
~ remain the law it is difficult to find too much fault 
with the Ohio statute. Some of the foregoing is marginal 
2. 
..:.. - -
(such as lending equipment to individuals on a fictional 
basis), but I am not yet persuaded that aid of this kind can-
not pass the three-part test applied in these cases. It may 
be that some of our cases have gone too far in drawing 
artificial lines between aid that is permissible and that 
which Js invalid. I do not find it easy to identify the 
principled rationale for deciding some of these questions. 
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No. 76-496 Wolman v. Essex 
This is another "establishment-of-religion" case, 
in which Ohio tailored it aid to private schools to meet 
the criteria of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349. The three-
judge court sustained the validity of the Ohio statute. 
The following categories of aid are involved: 
1. Loans of textbooks. Appellants conceded 
validity on the basis of Meek and Allen. 
2. Loans to pupils of materials and equipment. 
Equipment such as that used in laboratories, gym equipment, 
sewing machines, etc., are to be lent to pupils rather than 
directly to the schools, although the equipment will be stored 
on premises. In Meek, we invalidated loans of equipment 
directly to the schools. We may have been drawing lines 
that are too fine, and making unprincipled distinctions. 
Lending equipment - conceded to be nonsectarian - does aid 
private schools, whether the loans are to the pupils or to 
the schools. But on the authority of Allen, if equipment 
is made available to all students in the state on the same 
terms I see no principled distinction. 
3. Diagnostic services. Apparently appellants 
concede that provision of physician, optometric and nursing 





rendering this service come to the schools. 
But appellants try to draw a distinction with 
respect to speech, hearing and psychological diagnosis. I 
see no basis for a distinction. 
4. Therapeutic services. These are services to 
be rendered children with speech or hearing deficiencies, 
or who are crippled or emotionally disturbed. This State 
proposes to establish therapeutic centers in curbside mobile 
units or on nonschool premises. I see no problem. The 
services are provided all public and private school students 
in the State. 
5. Standardized testing. Standardized tests are 
given to all school pupils for purposes of accreditation. 
They have nothing to do with religion. 
6. Field trip busing. In Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, the Court held that bus transportation 
of all children - to public and private schools - was valid. 
Here, transportation is to be provided for special educational 
purposes exclusive of religious education. 
Comment: 
Although the State aid provided by Ohio to private 
schools is quite extensive, and certainly will contribute to 
the viability of such schools, as long as Allen, Everson and 
Meek remain the law it is difficult to find too much fault 






(such as lending equipment to individuals on a fictional 
basis), but I am not yet persuaded that aid of this kind can-
not pass the three-part test applied in these cases. It may 
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artificial lines between aid that is permissible and that 
which is invalid. I do not find it easy to identify the 
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C HAM BERS Of" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 6, 1977 
✓ 
MEMORANDUM T O THE CONFERENCE 
Re : No . 76-496 - Wolm an v . Walter 
A little later today I shall be di s tributing in xerox copy 
form a proposed opinion in this case . 
Past exper i ence discloses that the vote s of the Confer e nce 
in this area of state-aid-to- sectarian- schools is fractionated. It 
is thus extra ordinarily difficult to put tog e th e r an opinion that will 
command vot e s of a Court. I a m not sure , e ither , that my posi -
tion, as expre ss e d at confer e nce on April 27 _was fully r e pres e nta-
tive. The usual pattern is for two votes to be in favor of constitu-
tionality gene rally, for t w o to be in favor of unconstitutionality 
generally, and for the other five to c o me to · re st at varying points 
of the spectrum. 
Accordingly, I have atte mpte d to segment this op1n1on . 
This suggests joinders in part. Hope fully, we shall be able to 
arrive at some resolution of the c a se . 
Inasmuch as the Ohio statute is an obvious attempt to con-
form to the holding in Meek v . Pittenger , it may well be, as was 
suggeste d at conference, that what we do here will emerge as the 
pattern for other state aid programs. 
1a. l 
C H AM BERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
• -;§iuµrmtt {!Jnurl .of tip• J!nilill ;§Wrs 
Ji'Jasfyhtgfon. g:l . QJ. 2LJpJ!.~ 
June 8, 1977 
76-496, Wolman v. Walter 
Dear Harry, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
') ~,, s ' 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




C H A M BE R S OF 
J USTIC E BYRON R. WHITE 
- -
.§u:pumt QJourt of tlp ~t~ .§tatts-
~ aslp:nghm. ~. QJ. 20ffeJ!.~ 
June 14, 1977 
Re: No. 76-496 - Wolman v. Walter 
Dear Harry: 
/ 
Would you please add at the bottom of your opinion in 
this case the following: 
"For the reasons stated in Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist's separate opinion in Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349 (1975), and in his own dissenting 
opinion in Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), Mr. Justice White 
concurs ·· in the judgment .with respect to textbooks, 
testing and scoring, and diagnostic and therapeutic 
services (Parts III, IV, V and VI of the opinion) 
and dissents from the judgment with respect to 
instructional materials and equipment and field 
trips (Parts VII and VIII of the opinion)." 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to Conference 
-·· 
CHAMBERS OF 
;§u.p-u~ <!fourl of Ur~ ~tti:t.c~ j5mt.ts-
~agfp:n.gfon, l9. <!f. 2.llffe~.;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 17, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-496 - Wolman v. Walter 
My opinion in this case will be rerun by the Print Shop 
(1) to make stylistic changes, (2) to add the material suggested 
by Byron in his letter of June 14, (3) to add a new footnote 13 
dropped from the 5th line of the paragraph beginning on page 14, 
and (4) to change the numbering of succeeding footnotes. • 
A copy of the new footnote is enclosed. 
1a- t. 
,,. 
, __ .. No. 76-496 
}:ii 
We believe this concession reflects appellants I under-
standing that the programs are not intended to influence the classroom 
activities in the nonpublic schools. Our brother MARSHALL argues 
that certain stipulations regarding paragraph (H) announce that 
guidance counseling will include planning and selection of particular 
courses. Post, p. ___ • We agree that such involvement with the 
day-to-day curriculum of the parochial school would be impermissible. 
We, however, do not so read the stipulations. Rather, we understand 
them to recognize that a guidance counselor will engage in broad-
scale, long-term planning of a student's career choices and the general 
areas of study that will further those choices. Our brother MARSHALL 
also argues that the stipulations reflect an understanding that remedial 
service teachers under paragraph (I) will plan courses of study for use 
in the classroom. Post, p. ___ . Such a provision would pose grave 
~ 
constitutional questions. The stipulations, however, provide only that 
the remedial service teacher will keep the classroom teacher informed 
of the action taken. App. 49. We do not understand the stipulations 
to approve planning of classroom activities. 
! 
-
C HAMBER S OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
.§u:prmtt ~curt cf t fyt ~tb .§tatts 
~ttsfyingto-n:, ~ - ~- 2llffeJI,.;l 
June 20, 1977 
Re: 76-496 - Wolman v. Walter 
Dear Harry: 
I join Parts I, II, III, IV, V, VI. 
Show me as dissenting with respect to Parts VII 
and IX. 
~r~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
- -.§ u:pr tnt t C!J o urt of t~ t ~mfr b .§ta.its 
'J!lf a.s fyi:n gLm. ~- (!J. 20pJ!-,'.3 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 21, 1977 
RE: 76-496 - Wolman v. Walter 
Dear Harry: 
My memo of June 20, third line, has a 
"typo"; · the "IX" should have been VIII. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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It must be acknowledged that our decisions in 
this troubling area draw lines that often seem arbitrary. 
"· P,·#INe:r, '-/1.-4 (/. S. 3 "'" ~,, (,,,u--)J 
As the Court noted in Meek /\ "[s]ubstantial aid to the 
educational function of [sectarian] schools ... 
necessarily results in aid to the sectarian enterprise as 
a whole." • 2! J . B . et 3 ~ If this strictly pragmatic 
COlll\9 i Ae,-o.~•cn.-\ 
~ ~were the sole criterion ) it would be difficult to 
sustain any state aid to such schools - even if wholly 
secular in character and whether 
~fl~~ 
~ to the pupils or 
A 
;.f-.st I~ 
directly to the institutions. All@R; FJY@l7iil9ft i- Meek would 
--A 
have to be overruled J and the persistent desire of a 
number of states to find proper means of helping sectarian 
education to survive would be doomed. This Court has not 
yet thought that such a harsh result is required by the 
Establishment Clause. Certainly few would think it 
desirable in the public interest. Paroch h al schools, 
\J 
quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided • 
~ -~~ .,._(.f.~:vc.. 
wbsi s c ~ or millions of young Americans ~ they often afford 
wholesome competition with our public schools ; and in 
some states they relieve substantially the tax burden 
incident to the operation of public schools. SaL -'s• e •~cA 'f 
/4--'e .-:t\ :,v3 t;l.$ 3<>4 3 U • Stt( ( IC,S:a}. I J 
A~ e,ainse tAc • e ~esi~ivc eontrieutieHs., 
. k h. h . ' ' h,u,-1(.. ~'Y I f r1s al., t 1s point 1n t e/''¥ueAe 12 1 I Fil 1 ]6,, o 
~oM,~~ C.011\.+,.o( oy ._r 
religious ot'\. eieeFiminabieAa• iAF l ~e" ee en • .¢'ur democratic 
processes seems tolerable. is the 
repeated judgment o f\.the voters and/ their representatives 
in the several states that lonq/have sought valid means of 
assisting citizens who wish ,,.fh... preserve for their children 
the option of school. The decisions 
Meek, 
establish that ished safeguard 
Clause without resort t 
:I+ ;s ;~~ -to~~ ~..,. '"' 
11, (l,,&~S~cr.tt:v4..• 
11 Wexax~ At this point in the 20th century we 
are xex~x£ax quite far removed from the dangers 
that ~xa»gkxxxkex&xxa~lixkmeRk led the Framers to 
;hclude the Establishment Clause in the Bill of 
Rights. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970). The risk in our day of significant religious 
or demominational control over our democratic 
~ v :~ 
processes is remote J /\. ~en 1-ale:nee:;;1.., against the 
positive contributions of sectarian schools, aR~X 
x»~k it seems entirely tolerable. Th.e decisions of 
- - .-0Ml7. = "· ~· ~ v,,3' u. 5. 
this Court, Ai-nsr3:i:r upS ; 4lRlQR.t i ry 
? Th l I~ H) "' • · ,l ::: :: :1t")(1.1....i --
,uatar-e or the twe r~;::ipuses, see JilaJ iii, ~Y~ 
~t , have sought to establish principles that 
preserve the cherished safeguard £a of the Establishrrent 
Clause without resort to blind absolutism. flMost of 
~,1~ ~ f~"', 
the Court's decision today•1oitlttn tlri" -'Piii&o... and 
I 81111 plaa11d ts join parts I throught VI of the Court's 
:C ~e.,t--~ T ~ -..l°'~ ~ ~st--. 
opinion. A ~Q i;:es t, R@'iil@¥@F, s eem" e:o me @R HA.fgrrouoate-
rlPt:A I I 111 P 




--------l'lB--,, JU31ICE POWELL, concurr i ng in part and di ss entitr? 
~ 
I j_Qin Parts I through VI ef the Court ' s opinien, 
With respect to Part VII , I join only in the 
judgment. I am not persuaded, nor did the Court hold 
in Meek., II PitleR1'VS;. 42] 11: £ . 3l,.9 (l',75~ that all 
loans of secular instructional material and equipment 
"inescapably [haveJ the primary effect of providing 
a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian 
enterprise." Ante, at 29-30. If that were the case, 
then Meek surely would have overruled ~ears @f ~s~eaei@:z 
.-?If Alle90 9,£ tf . 1' . 296 (19e ~~ Instead the Court 
at least the educational 
process are permissible--so long as the .& items are 
incapable of diversion to religious uses, and so long 
as they are lent to the individual students or their 
parents and not to the sectarian institutions . Here 
the statute is expressly limited to materials incapable 
~
of diversion. Therefore the im~eFeent question is 
whether the materials are such that they are "furnished 
-2-
for the use of individual students and at their 
>-,'2- ,J .s .> 
request . " Allen , .iJ~JH•~~at 244 , n . 6 (emphasis 
added). 
The Ohio statute unfortunately embraces some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for wmich the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of 
these items is indistinguishable from forbidden 
"direct aid" to the sectarian institution itself, 
If 2.1 t).t ., 
whoever the technical bailee. See Meek, 
362-x 366. Since the provision makes no attempt 
to distinguish a these iatl iaaiaia instructional 
materials from others meaningfull3/ lent to individuals, 
~~ 
I agree with the Court that it~~et! e@< hcls uncoosti-
~ ~~,u--v p.«fUc:P......._~ ,.  
.A cationrl. But I would find no~ a properly 
limited provision lendingAonly apprppriate instructional 
L ,,u.: ... u .. v---k> ~ """'.IL~ )2A.t4u....> ~ . 
materials and equipmen§J to the individuals themsew~ 
I dessent as to Part VIII, concerning field trip 
transportation . The Court writes as though the 




the studen t:$ on the outing . In fact only the bus 
and driver are provided, for the limited purpose of 
physical movement between the school and the secular 
~ 
destination of the field trip. ~ I find this aid 
~~-'-~~ s 
indistl nguishable'I. from that upheld in 'f,_verson)I ~ 1 
f J!dacatton, 0 i (191¥7~ ...i. I vIDuld 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this 
pro¾iB~ t of the • Ohio statute . ,... 
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No. 76-496 Wolman v. Walter 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
It must be acknowledged that our decisions in 
this troubling area draw lines that often seem arbitrary. 
Aa ~Re GewFe Aeee~ iA / Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 
(1975) : "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of 
[sectarian] schools ... necessarily results in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole." If this strictly 
~~ ~vu-, 
pragmatic consideration were ~ he sole criterion, Ait would 
:::.~- , ....... ,;'". "" :t /, ... •-,;·, ..i. '"k:.:i;..J, ,£ 
~ osslle,.. o ... 
be ;iif::~~11~o~ s tate aid~ td nt sol ol 
I • I 
~tl~CM"'~ 
A even • J wholly 
.._;s 
secular in character and ~AetAe~ supplied 
A 
ro..-~~ 
to the pupils ~ .Qi£Q8el¥ to the institutions. Meek 
itself would have to be overruled, along with Board of 
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and Everson v. 
----Bo a rd of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)0 a-ft& t he persistent -. 
~ 
desire of a number of states to find proper means of 
helping sectarian education to survive would be doomed. 
This Court has not yet thought that such a harsh result is 
required by the Establishment Clause. Certainly few would 
think it desirable in the public interest. Parochial 
schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have 
provided an educatio~ ternative for millions of young 
Arnericans4 they often afford wholesome competition with 
) 
our public schoolsA and in some states they relieve 
) 
substantially the tax burden incident to the operation ~ 
~ .S~e. ~s_.~..__.:te. ;"'-"te..r>e.st- ;v-. +-.~(d·o.~d ~ 
~ 
~~-""""' o~ ~ lM.~rt" 'iva..(,"7. -.f.t,y-
publ ic schools. - 11 -'·- ,u· ".L L 1 _. .J ..:i. (>/VI. ~ w • ,.,_ .._ I~ fiii'~I e.S ~ell~ 
seL..o(~fA""~ ~~~~- , 
It is important to keep the matter in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
quite far removed from the dangers that led the Framers to 
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. 
See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The -
risk a &Mr s ap of significant religious or denominational 
--of" eVfM ~ .. ~ f'°\;~vJ_ c,liv,sf"°' .,(°:A re,\i~vuc. lllll.AS:: 
I 
control over our democratic remote, and when 
viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian 
~ S1A.cL ~-~ 
schools, R=-Aseems entirely tolerable. The decisions of 
this Court -- notabJ;y Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 75 ~ 
(1973~ and recently Meek -- have sought to establish 
l 
2.. 
principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the .u ~ 
-r~ ~. ~s ~ IM-s ~ •~ ~(~-f.i....(. -HJ...14.cU ..µ •• •-~ ~ 
' • _.JJ, ~ ,, ~ .. ,~. 
Establishment Clause without resort to blind absoluti m. l\.. 
Most of the Court's decision today follows ~ 
(N.-r salttt4.. ~ 
;.,pattern, and I join parts I through VI ofA~~ Ceurt•s 
opinion. I regret that I cannot join the rest. 
C..G"'\14.CAH" 
With respect to Part VII, I join only ,._in the 
judgment. I am not persuaded, nor d i d the Court hold in 
Meek, that all loans of secular instructional material and 
equipment "inescapably [have] the pr i mary effect of 
providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
sectarian enterprise." Ante, at 29-30. If that were the 
case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily 
s 
holding that at least some such loans of materia 'U ~ 
@~tti"meA e,r helpful in the educational process are 
permissible -- so long as the items are incapable of 
diversion to religious uses, and so long as they are lent 
to the individual students or their parents and not to the 
sectarian institutions. Here the statute is expressly 
limited to materials incapable of diversion. Therefore 
the relevant question is whether the materials are such 
that they are "furnished for the use of individual 
students and at their request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, 
n. 6 (emphasis added). 
i VI cl ul-4.s, 
The Ohio statute unfortunately Aemb£aces some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for which the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of these 
items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to 
.3. 
'!. 
the sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
s~c. 
provision makes no attempt to ~isei"gMistr these 
-l. 
instructional materials from others meaningfully lent to 
individuals, I agree with the Court that it cannot be 
sustained under our precedents. But I would find no 
constitutional defect in a properly limited provision 
lending to the individuals them+ es only appropriate 
instructional materials and equipment similar to that used 
in public schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided, for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
. ,. 
, LFP/lab 6/17/77 
No. 76-496 Wolman v. Walter 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
It ffiUSt be aokAowJ e dged th~ o ur decisions in 
;vt.4.S/-
th is troubling area draw lines that ofte~m arbitrary. 
No d,f-1,f.,H' 
T~ece is saroe sPggestion that we could achieve g r eater 
analytical tidiness if we wer~ o1-d her e s t ~ y ~e aR 
421 U.S. 349, 366 
.;ft F . 
/';, =7 
u</ 
( 19 7 5) >I•~ o i;: 1,s ta R<i al •; cl te Lite ed uca Li o u~l f "Ret i on o f 
_s+r., ka drfwK.. a.Lt "5 ~ ½5,csk:..t:~ ~--t-~ 
[sectarian] schooJs C. 11 necessarily results in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole.)_ ~ ~ig ~kictl~ 
~ Q 6 . 1 • 1 . • ~ a., 1' ::___ , r 111 w, zce ... ,.; 1, I' "w z ---:_ :.:•- __ - .. ,,,,..,,_t ·o , 
1 
~ 
;ml"Cl;=iG ;:R:i:6:!': :Q:.Q. :", b•~z~z;; sole er j tef i PO--. 
~ owever, it would be i mpos sible to sustain state aid of 
l ,At 7Ft:' ,~ 
any kind--even if the aid~ wholly secular in character 
and ~ to the pupils rather than to the 
~ 
institutions . Meek itself would have to be overruled, 
along with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) . The persistent desire of a number of states to 
find proper means of helping sectarian e ducation to 
survive would be doomed. Th is Court has not yet thought 
that such a harsh result is required by the Es t ablishment 
Clause. Certainly few would think it ~in the 
public interest. Parochial schools, quite apart from 
their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans; they often 
' 
afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and 
in some states they relieve substantially the tax burden 
• 
incident to the operation of public schools. The State 
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all children within 
its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen 
for them. 
It. ~AAI -
is important to k ,-~ eep the ~atte~ in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
pro~e+d.. 
quite far removed from the dangers that ~~the Framers to 
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. 
See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The 
risk of significant religious or denominational control 
over our democratic processes--or even of deep political 
division along religious lines--is remote, and when viewed 
against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, 
any such risk seems entirely tolerable. The decisions of 
this Court -- notably Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 756 
(1973), and recently M~ek -- have sought to establish 
2 
principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the 
Establishment Clause without resort - to blind absolutism. 
If this means a loss of some analytical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. 
Most of the Court's decision today follows~ 
; v.. ~, +rc,,.cl~~O"Y\.> 
s;..ettk<l ~atte~~ and I join parts I through VI of its 
opinion. I regret that I cannot join the rest. 
~ 
With respect to Part VII, I concur in 
th~udgment. I am not persuaded, nor did the Court hold 
in Meek, that all loans of secular instructional material 
and equipment "inescapably [have] the primary effect of 
providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
I g', 
sectarian enterprise." Ante, atA..icfJ~ 30-;, If that were the 
case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily 
holding that at least some such loans of materials 
helpful in the educational process are permissible -- so 
long as the items are incapable of diversion to religious 
uses, and so long as they are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions. Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the materials are such that they are 
3 
o/ 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). 
The Ohio statute unfortunately includes some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for which the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of these 
items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to 
the sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others meaningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be susta ined under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that used in public schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided, for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
s 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
.. 
.,._ 
O' ~'3 ti,. 
• 
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No. 76-496 Wolman v. Walter 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
~ must be ac know l edife d Eli~ our decisions in 
_ J ·JlbP)e ~  
this troubling area e raw il nes that ofte'.J. seem arbitrary. 
. No~ 
:Eia@~8 i • : sag; I w"~t we could achieve greater 
A • -(}:-• ~,. ,( ~ ~, i1 .; .. .,. t. • ,._,~ ,t 
analytical tidiness if we were t 'J\ &dhere etr:ir.lily es,: 1=+l • 
~ 
observation in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 
A ..... ~i,p-... -~ -r:;..- -~ " - ,µ " [s].J.sl,,....,/;...{ ) 
(1970> ~ .=::== oL )a id to the educational function of 
[sectarian] schools . . . necessarily results in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole." i-ct1)-
'f'1'ilgmatic co11side:ratiQR were to becoroe tb~ eole eFiLetlon, 
\..., -r.f' ~ ~ ~ ~, \ 
~ it would ~~ible to sustain state aid of 
any kind--even if the aid is wholly secular in character 
and is supplied to the pupils rather than ~ e 
institutions . Meek itself would have to be overruled, 
along with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
e~t.M.. 
Everson v . . Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) . The persistent desire of a number of states to 
find proper means of helping sectarian education to 
survive would be doomed. This Court has not yet thought 
that such a harsh result is / required by the Establishme nt 
, 4 
r 
\._ C.O"- S, ~ _,/ 
would tat5J it -€1-8s k~ in Clause. Certainly few the 
public interest. Parochial schools, quite apart from 
their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans; they often 
~ 
afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and 
in some states they relieve substantially the tax burden 
• 
incident to the operation of public schools. The State 
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all children within 
its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen 
for them. ~. ~···.,,, 
It is important to keep ~~ @ M~e~@r in 
~ 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
pro~e+d... 
quite far removed from the dangers that i;e:i~the Framers to 
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. 
See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The 
risk of significant religious or denominational control 
over our democratic processes--or even of deep political 
division along religious lines--is remote, and when viewed 
against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, 
any such risk seems entirely tolerable. The decisions of 
this Court R@t ably Lefflell o . n11re1mm11 , 4 0 3 Q ~. 7 56 _)--
(1 9 7 3 ) , a nd recently Heck ., have sought to/establish 
z. 
""° ~ 
principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the 
Establishment Clause without resort to blind absolutism. 
~~o~ 
If thisAmeans a loss of some analytical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. 
3 
of the Court's decision today follows J-
• _j,J. ,.J.. _j •J _• 
IV\ i ""' ' I ( C,,.. c,..1 \'O'Y\) 
~~ ~ and I join parts I through VI of its 
opinion. I regret that I cannot join the rest. 
=IF 
With respect to Part VII, I concur in 
~ 
thT udgment. I am not persuaded, nor did A~~@ Ceatl holdJ 
'"' Hee ~ that all loans of secular instructional material 
and equipment "inescapably [have] the primary effect of 
providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
Ii'. 
sectarian enterprise." Ante, at A.~- 3 0:'.)I If that were the 
case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily 
holding that at least some such loans of materials 
helpful in the educational process are permissible -- so 
long as the items are incapable of diversion to religious 
uses, and so long as they are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions. Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the/materials are such that they are 
.- o/ 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
' 
request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). r- The Ohio statutJ ;;mfot ta110Ld ~ includes some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for which the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of these 
items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to 
the sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S. , at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others me aningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be sustained under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that used in public schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided, for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
4 
s 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra , I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
, 
•· LFP/lab 6/17/77 
No. 76-496 Wolman v. Walter 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
It must be acknowledged that our decisions in 
this troubling area draw lines that often seem arbitrary. 
There is some suggestion that we could achieve greater 
analytical tidiness if we were to adhere strictly to an 
observation in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 
(1975): "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of 
[sectarian] schools ... necessarily res ults in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole." If this ~-i~ 
1)/.. 
pragmatic consideration were to become the sole criterion, 
however, it would be impossible to sustain state aid of 
any kind--even if the aid is wholly secular in character 
and is supplied to the pupils rather than to the 
institutions. Meek itself would have to be overruled, 
along with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947). The persistent desire of a number of states to 
find proper means of helping sectarian education to 
survive would be doomed. This Court has not yet thought 
that such a harsh result is required by the Establishment 
Clause. Certainly few would think it desirable in the 
public interest. Parochial schools, quite apart from 
their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans; they often 
' 
afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and 
in some states they relieve substantially the tax burden 
• 
incident to the operation of public schools . The State 
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all children within 
its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen 
for them. 
It is important to keep the matter in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
pro~eM 
quite far removed from the dangers that ~~the Framers to 
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights . 
See Wal z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The 
risk of significant religious or denominational control 
over our democratic processes--or even of deep political 
division along religious lines--is remote, and when viewed 
against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, 
any such risk seems entirely tolerable. The decisions of 
this Court -- notably Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 756 
(1973), and recently Meek -- have sought to establish 
2 
3 
principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the 
Establishment Clause without resort to blind absolutism. 
If this means a loss of some analytical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. 
Most of the Court's decision today follows~ 
• __j,,/ • ,J.. cl' j ~· 
I II\ 'i lM, 1. I ( C,.. I 't'\ O"'Y\.) 
~~~ and I join parts I through VI of its 
opinion. I regret that I cannot join the rest. 
~ 
With respect to Part VII, I concur in 
thfudgment. I am not persuaded, nor did the Court hold 
in Meek, that all loans of secular instructional material 
and equipment "inescapably [have] the primary effect of 
providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
I ct. 
sectarian enterprise . " Ante, at A.~~ If that were the 
case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily 
holding that at least some such loans of materials 
helpful in the educational process are permissible -- so 
long as the items are incapable of diversion to religious 
uses, and so long as they are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions . Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the materials are such that they are 
t/ 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
' 
request." Allen, 392 U.S . , at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). 
The Ohio statute unfortunately includes some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for which the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of these 
items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to 
the sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others meaningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be sustained under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that used in public schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
\; 
students on the outing . In fact ) only the bus and driver 
are provided, for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
s 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
It must be acknowledged that our decisions in 
this troubling area draw lines that often seem arbitrary. 
There is some suggestion that we could achieve greater 
analytical tidiness if we were to adhere strictly to an 
observation in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 
(1975): "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function of 
[sectarian] schools ... necessarily results in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole." If this .9t!Yietslv>-
pragmatic consideration were to become the sole criterion, 
however, it would be impossible to sustain state aid of 
any kind--even if the aid is wholly secular in character 
and is supplied to the pupils rather than to the 
institutions. Meek itself would have to be overruled, 
along with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947). The persistent desire of a number of states to 
find proper means of helping sectarian education to 
survive would be doomed. This Court has not yet thought 
that such a harsh result is required by the Establishment 
Clause. Certainly few would think it desirable in the 
public interest. Parochial schools, quite apart from 
their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational 
alternative for millions of young Americans; they often 
'-
afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and 
in some states they relieve substantially the tax burden 
incident to the operation of public schools. The State 
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating 
education of the highest quality for all children within 
its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen 
for them. 
It is important to keep the matter in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
pro\Ao\r+ctal 
quite far removed from the dangers that -=-~ the Framers to 
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. 
See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The 
risk of significant religious or denominational control 
over our democratic processes--or even of deep political 
division along religious lines--is remote, and when viewed 
against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, 
any such risk seems entirely tolerable. The decisions of 
bD~ 
thi~.;;urt -- notably Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s ~ ./-!Hi 
(19 7/ J, and recently Meek -- have sought to establish 
z 
principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the 
Establishment Clause without resort to blind absolutism. 
If this means a loss of some analytical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. 
Most of the Court's decision today follows e.w;. 
~"" -te., +,~cl,~~, 
SoQfi~l@s pattern_ and I join parts I through VI of its 
opinion. I regret that I cannot join the rest. 
~ 
With respect to Part VII, I concur in 
thf udgment. I am not persuaded, nor did the Court hold 
in Meek, that all loans of secular instructional material 
and equipment "inescapably [have] the primary effect of 
providing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
11'. 
sectarian enterprise." Ante, atAi,Jj O t4: If that were the 
case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily 
holding that at least some such loans of materials 
helpful in the educational process are permissible -- so 
long as the items are incapable of diversion to religious 
uses, and so long as they are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions. Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the materials are such that they are 
3 
~ 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). 
The Ohio statute unfortunately includes some 
materials like wall maps, charts and other classroom 
paraphernalia for which the concept of a loan to 
individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan of these 
items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to 
the sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others meaningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be sustained under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that used in public schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided, for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
s-
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines 
that often must seem arbitrary. No doubt we could achieve 
greater analytical tidiness if we were to accept the 
broadest implications of the observation in Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975), that "[s]ubstantial 
aid to the educational function of [sectarian] schools .. 
. necessarily results in aid to the sectarian enterprise 
as a whole." If we took that course, it would become 
impossible to sustain state aid of any kind--even if the 
aid is wholly secular in character and is supplied to the 
pupils rather than the institutions. Meek itself would 
have to be overruled, along with Board of Education v. 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and even perhaps Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The persistent 
desire of a number of states to find proper means of 
2. 
helping sectarian education to survive would be doomed. 
This Court has not yet thought that such a harsh result is 
required by the Establishment Clause. Certainly few would 
consider it in the public interest. Parochial schools, 
quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an 
educational alternative for millions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our public 
schools; and in some states they relieve substantially the 
~ 
tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. 
The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in 
facilitating education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school their 
parents have chosen for them. 
It is important to keep these issues in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the 
Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of 
Rights. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970). The risk of significant religious or 
denominational control over our democratic processes--or 
even of deep political division along religious lines--is 
remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions 
of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely 
tolerable in view of the continuing oversight of this 
Court. Our decisions have sought to establish principles 
that preserve the cherished safeguard of the Establishment 
?f -
3. 
Clause without resort to blind absolutism. If this 
endeavor means a loss of some analytical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. Most of the Court's 
decision today follows in this tradition, and I join parts 
I through VI of its opinion. 
/_ With respect to Part VII, I concur in the 
judgment. I am not persuaded, nor did Meek hold, that all 
loans of secular instructional material and equipment 
"inescapably [have] the primary effect of providing a 
direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian 
enterprise." Ante, at 18. If that were the case, then 
Meek surely would have overruled Allen. Instead the Court 
reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily holding that at 
least some such loans of materials helpful in the 
educational process are permissible -- so long as the 
ct:ct is 
~tem~ aEeAincapable of diversion to religious uses, cf. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
( 
f/\11.-.-fe.r • MS 
1973)> and so long as thetA are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions. Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the materials are such that they are 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). 
The Ohio statute includes some materials such 
as wall maps, charts and otqer classroom paraphernalia for 
.. -
4. 
which the concept of a loan to individuals is a 
transparent fiction. A loan of these items is 
indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to the 
sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others meaningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be sustained under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that customarily used in public 
schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
~-.... .. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. • 
Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines 
that often must seem arbitrary. No doubt we could achieve 
greater analytical tidiness if we were ~o accept the 
broadest implications of the observation in Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975), that "[s]ubstantial 
aid to the educational function of [sectarian] schools .. 
. necessarily results in aid to the sectarian enterprise 
as a whole." If we took that course, it would become 
i mpossible to sustain state aid of any kind--even if the 
aid is wholly secular in character and is supplied to the 
pupils rather than the institutions. Meek itself would 
have to be overruled, along with Board of Education v. 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and even perhaps Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The persistent 
desire of a number of states to find proper means of 
- ... .;, 
~ 
2. 
helping sectarian education to survive would be doomed. 
This Court has not yet thought that such a harsh result is • 
required by the Establishment Clause. Certainly few would 
consider it in the public interest. Parochial schools, 
quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an 
educational alternative for millions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our public 
schools; and in some states they relieve substantially the 
tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. 
The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in 
facilitating education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school their 
parents have chosen for them. 
It is important to keep these issues in 
perspective. At this point in the 20th century we are 
quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the 
Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of 
Rights. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970). The risk of significant religious or 
denominational control over our democratic processes--or 
even of deep political division along religious lines--is 
remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions 
of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely 
tolerable in view of the continuing oversight of this 
Court. Our decisions have sought to establish principles 
that preserve the cherished safeguard of the Establishment 
- .., 3. 
Clause without resort to blind absolutism. If this 
endeavor means a loss of some analy tical tidiness, then 
that too is entirely tolerable. Most of the Court's 
decision today follows in this tradition, and I join parts 
I through VI of its opinion . . 
With respect to Part VII, I concur in the 
judgment. I am not persuaded, nor did Meek hold, that all 
loans of secular instructional material and equipment 
"inescapably [have] the primary effect of providing a 
direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian 
enterprise ." Ante, at 18. If that were the case, then 
Meek surely would have overruled Allen. Instead the Court 
reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily holding that at 
least some such loans of materials helpful in the 
educational process are permissible -- so long as the 
items are incapable of diversion to religious uses, cf. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
197 3) and so long as they are lent to the individual 
students or their parents and not to the sectarian 
institutions. Here the statute is expressly limited to 
materials incapable of diversion. Therefore the relevant 
question is whether the materials are such that they are 
"furnished for the use of individual students and at their 
request." Allen, 392 U.S., at 244, n. 6 (emphasis added). 
The Ohio statute includes some materials such 
as wall maps, charts and other classroom paraphernalia for 
' ~ ... 4. 
which the concept of a loan to individuals is a 
transparent fiction. A loan of these items is 
indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" to the 
sectarian institution itself, whoever the technical 
bailee. See Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366. Since the 
provision makes no attempt to separate these instructional 
materials from others meaningfully lent to individuals, I 
agree with the Court that it cannot be sustained under our 
precedents. But I would find no constitutional defect in 
a properly limited provision lending to the individuals 
themselves only appropriate instructional materials and 
equipment similar to that customarily used in public 
schools. 
I dissent as to Part VIII, cQncerning field 
trip transportation. The Court writes as though the 
statute funded the salary of the teacher who takes the 
students on the outing. In fact only the bus and driver 
are provided for the limited purpose of physical movement 
between the school and the secular destination of the 
field trip. As I find this aid indistinguishable in 
principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, I would 
sustain the District Court's judgment approving this part 
of the Ohio statute. 
I, •t • I" 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often 
must seem arbitrary. No doubt we could achieve greater 
analytical tidiness if we were to accept the broadest implica-
tions of the observation in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 
366 (1975). that "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational func-
tion of [sectarian] schools ... necessarily results in aid to 
the sectarian enterprise as a whole." If we took that course, 
it would become impossible to sustain state aid of any kind-
even if the aid is wholly secular in character and is supplied to 
the pupils rather than the institutions. Meek itself would 
have to be overruled, along with Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 U. S. 236 (1968), and even perhaps Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). The persistent desire of a 
number of States to find proper means of helping sectarian 
education to survive would be doomed. This Court has not 
yet thought that such a harsh result is required by the 
Establishment Clause. Certainly few would consider it in the 
public interest. Parochial schools, quite apart from their 
sectarian purpose. have provided an educational alternative 
for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States they 
relieve subst11ntially the ta;x burden incident to the operation 
of public schools. ·The State has, moreover, a legitimate 
< ~ 
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interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all 
children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents 
have chosen for them. 
It is important to keep these issues in perspective. At this 
point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the 
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establish-
ment Clause in the Bill of Rights. See Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, 397 U. S. 664. 668 (1970). The risk of significant 
religious or denominational control over our democratic proc-
esses-or even of deep political division along religious lines-
is remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions 
of sectarian schools. any such risk seems entirely tolerable in 
view of the continuing oversight of this Court. Our decisions 
have sought to establish principles tha.t preserve the cherished 
safeguard of the Establishment Clause without resort to blind 
absolutism. If this endeavor means a loss of some analytical 
tidiness. then that too is entirely tolerable. Most of the 
Court's decision today follows in this tradition, and I join 
Parts I through VI of its opinion. 
With respect to Part VII. I concur in thE judgment. I am 
not persuaded. nor did Meek hold , that all loam: of secular 
instructional material and equipment "inescapably [have l the 
pri1nary effect of providing a direct and substautial advance-
ment of the sectarian enterprise." Ante, at 18. It that were 
the case, then Meek surely would have overruled Allen. 
Instead the Court reaffirmed Allen, thereby necessarily hold-
ing that at least some such loans of materials helpful in the 
educational process are permissible-so long- a~ the aid is 
incapable of diversion to religious uses. cf. Cumm1ttee for 
Public Education v. iVyquist, 413 U. S. 756 ( 1973). and so 
long as the materials are lent to the individual students or 
their parents and not to the sectarian institutions. Here the 
statute is expressly limited to materials incapable of diver-
sio11. Therefore the relevant question is whether the materials 
are such that they are "furnished for the use of individual 
" (. . .. 
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students and at their request." Allen, 392 U. S., at 244 n. 6 
(emphasis added). 
The Ohio sta.tute iucludes some materials such as wall maps, 
charts and other classroom paraphernalia for which the con-
cept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction. A loan 
of these items is indistinguishable from forbidden "direct aid" 
to the sectarian institution itself. whoever the technical bailee. 
See Meek, 421 r. S .. at 362-366. Since the provision makes 
no attempt to separate these instructional materials from 
others meaningfully lent to individuals, I agree with the Court 
that it cannot be sustained under our precedents. But I 
would find no constitutional defect in a properly limited pro-
vision lending to the individuals themselves only appropriate 
instructional materials and equipment similar to that custom-
arily used in public schools. 
1 dissent as to Part VIII, concerning field trip transporta-
tion. The Court writes as though the statute funded the 
salary of the teacher who takes the students on the outing. 
In fact only the bus and driver are provided for the limited 
purpose of physical movement between the school and the 
secular destination of the field trip. As I find this aid indis-
tinguishable in principle from that upheld in Everson, supra, 
I would sustain the District Court's judgment approving this 
part of the Ohio statute. 
